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Abstract—Increasingly more attention is paid to the privacy
in online applications due to the widespread data collection
for various analysis purposes. Sensitive information might be
mined from the raw data during the analysis, and this led to
a great privacy concern among people (data providers) these
days. To deal with this privacy concerns, multitudes of privacy-
preserving computation schemes are proposed to address various
computation problems, and we have found many of them fall into
a class of problems which can be solved by greedy algorithms.
In this paper, we propose a framework for distributed greedy
algorithms in which instances in the feasible set come from
different parties. By our framework, most generic distributed
greedy algorithms can be converted to a privacy preserving one
which achieves the same result as the original greedy algorithm
while the private information associated with the instances is still
protected.
I. INTRODUCTION
People used to pay more attention to the functionality and
the successfulness of the optimization in any application, and
less of it is paid to the privacy aspect. However, the situation
is very different now. Great amount of digital information is
collected for the information-based decision making, on which
various data mining techniques can be applied to achieve
useful information ([6], [19], [23], [25]). For example, Netflix
uses a dataset of users and their rating history to develop
a recommendation system to recommend a movie to their
visitors (e.g., [4], [63]), and Amazon uses the purchase history
to recommend items to users (e.g., [34]). The original purpose
of these data mining techniques is not to steal individuals’
sensitive information, however, it is shown that sensitive
information can be achieved illegally if the data is provided
in the original format ([20]), and it is also shown that naive
anonymization does not work in many cases ([39], [13], [61]).
Subsequently, more and more people are becoming aware
that the individual data provided to various third parties can
be used to disclose a lot of sensitive information besides the
original purpose ([3], [53]), and the privacy is becoming one
of the top concerns in many applications these days. We focus
on a type of problems which 1) involve multiple agents and
2) are solved by greedy algorithms. That is, we investigate
on problems which need to come up with a solution set from
a large group of individual data set. Following problems are
good examples from our real life:
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1) Weighted Set Cover Problem (WSCP): There is a universe
set of items. Each individual holds a subset of items,
and a real-number value is assigned to each subset as a
weight. Individuals need to find the subsets the union of
which forms the universe set, and the goal is to minimize
the sum of weights of those subsets. Each individual’s
weight is a private information, and each individual only
learns whether their set is included or not. A weighted
seet packing problem can be depicted analogously. The
goal is to find subsets whose pair-wise intersection gives
an empty set while maximizing the sum of weights.
2) Winner Determination problem in Combinatorial Auc-
tions (WDCA) ([44]): Multiple bidders bid for a set of
heterogeneous items which are auctioned by an auction-
eer. Bidders may choose a subset of the items (usually
called as a bundle) and place a bid for the bundle. Auc-
tioneer chooses a group of bidders as the winners such
that no single item is allocated to more than one bidder
and the revenue or the social efficiency is maximized. At
the end, the auctioneer knows only the winners, and the
bidders knows nothing but whether they are chosen as the
winner. Note that this problem is essentially a weighted
set packing problem.
3) Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP): There is a graph
with individual nodes and their edges. A Hamiltonian
circuit starting from a specific node should be found from
this graph, and the objective is to minimize the cost of the
circuit. The cost associated with each edge is a private
information of the node incident to the edge, and which
edges are selected in the circuit is private as well. At
the end, each individual node learns nothing but which
two edges among their incident edges are included in the
Hamiltonian circuit.
In all such problems, some party provides data, and a
solution (either global or local) is computed based on the
complete information about all parties’ data, and this is where
the privacy concerns emerge and the following non-trivial job
is expected: same solution is achieved without the global view
on the complete information. If this job is completed, the
privacy concern is also solved.
Much research has been conducted to solve the aforemen-
tioned non-trivial problem – achieving the result from the data
without ‘looking at’ the original data, and various types of
privacy-preserving computation schemes have been proposed
accordingly. For the WDCA, Yokoo et al. [58] proposed a
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2dynamic programming based solution and Naor et al. [38]
proposed a Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) based
solution respectively. Besides, considerably many solutions are
proposed for various problems using perturbation, sampling,
transformation, anonymization etc ([33], [2], [52], [15]). How-
ever, it seems less practical to develop a specific solution for
each individual problem in the real world. It is more desirable
to have a uniform framework for similar problems having same
properties.
In this paper, we start from the observation that there exists a
huge class of problems that can be solved or approximated by a
greedy algorithm, which we denote as greedy-class problems.
We propose a general framework for the distributed greedy
algorithm who receives input data from multiple parties so
that they can be converted to a privacy-preserving one. The
converted one achieves the same result as the generic one and
the individuals’ data privacy is still protected with the help of
the secure polynomial evaluation [27]. With our framework,
one does not have to study a specific solution for each problem.
Instead, he just needs to develop a good greedy algorithm for
the original problem and use our framework to convert it to a
privacy-preserving one.
Our contributions are summarized below:
1) We propose a general solution for multi-agent greedy
algorithms while protecting agents’ private information.
2) The privacy-preserving greedy algorithm generated by
our framework achieves the same result as the generic
greedy algorithm.
3) Based on the framework, we give an uniform definition of
the privacy for distributed greedy algorithms. We prove
that the framework does not breach the privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss rel-
evant works in Section II and formally define the backgrounds
as well as the problem in Section III. Our novel preliminary
techniques are proposed in Section IV, which will be used to
design our framework in Section V. After all, we evaluate our
framework in security and performance aspects in Section VI,
Section VII respectively and finally conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. DCOP, DCS and Our Greedy-Class Problem
Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP, [36],
[48]) is similar to our optimization problem. The only differ-
ence is that DCOP’s objective function is the sum of each
agent’s private cost (i.e., weight in this paper) while our
objective function is any function of it. That is, DCOP is a
special case of the optimization problem investigated in this
paper.
Universal solutions for any Distributed Constraint Optimiza-
tion Problem (DCOP) or any Distributed Constraint Satisfac-
tion (DCS) have long been a hot research topic ([41], [9], [46]),
but much less attention is paid to the privacy concerns when
compared to other aspects. [59], [60] presented approaches
to the DCS problem with cryptographic techniques, but their
methods rely on external servers which may not be always
available. Numerous works [47], [48], [56] discussed the DCS
with privacy enforcement, and finally Modi et al. proposed
ADOPT [36], which is a complete solver for the DCOP.
However, most of those works [48], [36], [49] suffer from
high communication complexity because they all rely on a
DFS tree which depicts the constraints relationship between
agents, and the total number of messages per agent grows
exponentially as the number of agents grows. To the best of our
knowledge, [64] is the only work which proposes a general so-
lution to the DCOP within a polynomial time based on a BFS
tree, but they assume each agent is not aware of the system’s
topology, otherwise privacy is not preservable. Sakuma et al.
[43] also proposed a genetic algorithm for privacy preserving
combinatorial auction, but their solution can only solve the
problems with the scalar product representation.
The contribution of this paper is prominent compared to
above works. First of all, the DCOP is the special case of
the greedy-class problem investigated in this paper. Secondly,
our framework converts any distributed greedy algorithm such
that the converted algorithm returns the final solution within
a polynomial time regarding the number of agents. Finally,
although we also assume a special organization of the agents
in advance (according to [27]), awareness of this organization
does not breach privacy in our work.
B. Privacy-Preserving Computation
Various approaches are proposed for different privacy-
preserving distributed optimization or decision making prob-
lems ([43], [31], [11], [18], [7]) , but it is more desirable
to have a general framework which can tackle the class of
problems having similar properties. A more generic approach
is desired, and Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC, [54],
[14], [22]) is a generic solution for the privacy-preserving
computation, in which n parties jointly and privately compute
any function fi(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = yi, where xi is the input
of the i-th party and yi is the output returned only to him.
Each party i knows nothing but yi. Since SMC evaluates any
function in a privacy-preserving manner, it can be directly
used to solve the distributed greedy-class problem in theory.
However, it converts the function or computation to a garbled
circuits ([55]) and evaluates the garbled circuits in a private
way with the oblivious transfer ([17]). This is how it achieves
the generic privacy-preserving computation, and it is also
why it suffers from a high computation and communication
complexities. Both complexities are linear to the size of the
garbled circuit with large hidden constant factors, and an
implementation of the SMC also shows its huge overhead
([5]). This drawback is critical especially in the distributed
system, therefore we rule out the SMC in this paper.
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is another common solution
to the privacy-preserving computation. It allows direct addi-
tions and multiplications on ciphertexts while preserving their
decryptability. That is, E(m1)∗E(m2) = E(m1∗ˆm2) for one
example, where E(m) is the ciphertext of m and ∗, ∗ˆ stand for
various homomorphic operations (e.g., addition, multiplication
etc).
3However, this cannot be directly used to solve our dis-
tributed greedy-class problem either because 1) HE requires
key exchanges via secure communication channel in advance;
2) HE has the same decryption key for every ciphertext, which
makes it difficult to let a party learns the final result without
knowing individual data.
In this paper, we propose a general framework for the dis-
tributed greedy-class problems while preserving each agent’s
privacy. Any problem falling into the class, which we formally
define in Section III, can be solved via our framework securely
and efficiently.
III. BACKGROUNDS & PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Distributed Greedy Algorithm
A greedy algorithm tries to find a global solution by making
a decision based on local view at each step. Although it does
not necessarily produce a globally optimal solution at the
end since each decision is made without looking at a global
view, it often approximates the global optimal solution. For
example, the WDCA and TSP are NP-Hard problems in which
a polynomial time algorithm for the optimum solution is not
found yet, thus greedy algorithm is used instead to achieve the
result within a certain approximation ratio. In the problems
we are investigating in this paper, inputs come from different
parties, which are usually called as agents, and one central
server with a complete view is required to make the decisions
at each step in a distributed (or multi-agent) greedy algorithm.
However, this naı¨ve solution arouses the privacy concerns, and
this is why we want to propose a framework for privacy-
preserving distributed greedy algorithms.
B. Greedy-Class Problems
In general, two classes of problems can be solved by greedy
algorithms: optimization problems and decision making prob-
lems. We call those problems as the greedy-class problems in
this paper, and they are formally defined as follows. A greedy-
class problem P = (I,D, d(·), f(·), l(·)) is a problem such
that:
1) It has a universe set of instances I = {i1, · · · , in} and
has to either come up with a final solution set Sˆ ⊆ I or
a message that there is no feasible solution set.
2) It has an information set D to be associated with each
instance i ∈ I .
3) It has a mapping d : I → D which returns the associated
information given an instance.
4) For an optimization problem, it has an objective function
f(S) to optimize (min or max), which returns a real
value given a feasible set S as the input; for a constraint
satisfaction problem, there is no objective function.
5) It has a feasibility function l(S) to check whether a set
of instances S = {ˆi1, , iˆ2, · · · } is feasible.
The Table I further explains our definitions with several
examples including three examples in Section I. Note that
the constraints satisfaction problems belong to the decision
making problems where objective function does not exist.
C. System & Adversary Model
Agents
Central Authority
𝐼1
𝐼2
𝐼3
𝐼4
𝐼5
𝑎1
𝑎2
𝑎3
𝑎4
𝑎5
 𝑆
Distributed
Greedy Algorithm
Privacy-Preserving
Distributed
Greedy Algorithm
Framework
(a) Agent-Authority Model
Agents Only
𝐼1
𝐼2
𝐼3
𝑎1
𝑎2
𝑎3
Distributed
Greedy Algorithm
Privacy-Preserving
Distributed
Greedy Algorithm
Framework
𝐼4
𝐼5
𝐼6
𝑎4
𝑎5
𝑎6
 𝑆1
 𝑆2
 𝑆3
 𝑆4
 𝑆5
 𝑆6
(b) All-Agents Model
In general, there are two models for any greedy-class
problem: agent-authority model and all-agents model.
In the agent-authority model, two entities participate in the
problem solving: a central authority and a group of non-
cooperative agents. Each agent aj ∈ {a0, · · · , an−1} holds
his instance ij ∈ I and the corresponding private information
d(ij) ∈ D. If an agent has more than one instance, we assume
the agent controls a virtual agent for each of his instances
([57]). In the agent-authority model, the central authority
receives a global solution set Sˆ of the problem when the
greedy algorithm terminates, and he learns nothing about any
private information d(ij), and agents learn nothing about Sˆ
after the greedy algorithm terminates on the other hand.
In the all-agents model, agents {a0, · · · , an−1} are the only
participants who want to jointly solve the problem. In this
model, each agent aj receives a local solution set Sˆj indicating
whether his instance is contained in the global solution set Sˆ.
No one in the system gains useful information about Sˆ.
Another model, in which the central authority achieves Sˆ
and each agent aj gets Sˆj , also exists, but this is a trivial
composition of aforementioned two models (one can use our
solution twice in two models) and thus is omitted.
We assume a semi-honest model in this work. That is, the
honest-but-curious agents and the central authority follow the
protocol specification in general, but they are interested in
others’ information and try to harvest them. That is, agents
try to infer the final solution set S as well as other agents’
private information, and the central authority tries to infer each
agent’s private information associated with the instances.
Also, we assume that it is computationally intractable to
solve the discrete logarithm problem as in other similar
research works ([26], [40], [32], [16], [62]).
D. Greedy Algorithm Analysis
Algorithm 1 is an example of a common greedy algorithm.
The definition of weight w(i, S) of each instance i and current
solution set is decided by the problem and its greedy solu-
tion. For example, in the greedy algorithm for the Knapsack
problem, the weight is each item’s value per weight; in the
Early Deadline First (EDF) algorithm for the Job Scheduling
problem, the weight is each job’s end time; in the WSCP, the
weight defined in its common greedy algorithm is marginal
gain per weight of the chosen set.
Different formats of greedy algorithms exist for different
types of problems (covering problem, packing problem, static
4TABLE I
SOME EXAMPLES
Problem instance i private info. d(i) solution set S objective function f(S) feasibility function l(S)
WDCA a bundle bid for a i goods allocation revenue or social efficiency of S no good is allocated more than once
TSP an edge cost of i selected edges sum of edge costs in S edges in S do not form a cycle
Knapsack an item i’s weight&value items selection S’s total value S’s total weight is less than capacity
Job Scheduling a job start & end time scheduled jobs # of jobs in S only one job is scheduled at any time
WSCP a set of items i’s weight chosen sets total weight of chosen sets all items are included in S
Algorithm 1 Generic Greedy Algorithm
1: S := ∅, and define the weight function w(i, S).
2: Given S, compute w(i, S) for each instance i.
3: Find the i = argmaxiw(i, S).
4: If l(S ∪ {i}) = True, S := S ∪ {i}.
5: Repeat 2-4 until the termination condition is satisfied.
6: Return S as the final solution set Sˆ.
weight etc.). In covering problems, the feasibility of current
set S is false until the termination condition is satisfied (e.g.,
TSP, Vertex Cover), while the feasibility of S is true until
the termination condition is satisfied in packing problems
(e.g., WDCA, Knapsack). Also, in some problems, weights
are irrelevant to the current set S (TSP, Job Scheduling), and
therefore the weight computation does not need to be repeated.
However, most of them are accepted in our framework with
slight conversion, and w.l.o.g. we discuss this specific example
since they can be converted to each other trivially. For exam-
ple, the Set Cover Problem is a covering problem in which
a given set S is feasible if the union of all instances is the
universe set U . In the greedy algorithm for this problem, the
union in Step 4 should be executed if S ∪ {i}’s feasibility is
false. Then, we can add a negation in front of the feasibility
function and use the same algorithm for the problem (with
slight modification at boundary conditions).
In a distributed greedy algorithm, the agents’ instances
should be sorted in the order of their weights and checks if
the merged set is still feasible. Three privacy concerns should
be addressed here.
First of all, the computation of w(S, i) may leak information
about the current solution set S as well as the private informa-
tion associated with the instance since each instance’s weight
often directly or indirectly discloses the private information of
the instance (e.g., edge cost in TSP).
Secondly, finding the instance with maximal weight may
also breach the confidentiality of private information related to
it. Therefore, the sorting should be conducted without knowing
any instance’s weight.
Thirdly, the feasibility function l(S ∪ {i}) may also leak
various sensitive information in two aspects. On one hand,
information about the final solution set S may be leaked to
agents since the intermediate set S should be merged with
someone’s instance i in each iteration. On the other hand, the
constraint associated with the feasibility may be relevant to
each instance’s private information, in which case evaluation
of the feasibility function l(·) involves the private information.
For example, weight of items in a 0-1 Knapsack problem,
start time and finish time in a job scheduling problem, and
elements contained in each set in the set cover problem should
be checked in l(·).
E. Problem Formulation
Given the analysis on possible information leakage, we
define the privacy of our framework as follows.
Definition 1. Given all the communication strings C during
the greedy algorithm and its output Output, an adversary’s
advantage over instance i’s private information d(i) is defined
as
advi = |Pr[d(i)|C,Output]− Pr[d(i)|Output]|
where Pr[d(i)] is the probability that a correct d(i) is inferred.
Definition 2. Given all the communication strings C during
the greedy algorithm and its output Output, an adversary’s
advantage over the final solution set Sˆ is defined as
advS =
∣∣∣Pr[Sˆ|C,Output]− Pr[Sˆ|Output]∣∣∣
where Pr[Sˆ] is the probability that any information about Sˆ
is inferred.
Definition 3. We say our framework securely converts a
generic greedy algorithm to a privacy-preserving one if no
polynomially bounded adversary (w.r.t the input size) has a
non-negligible advantage on the information not allowed to
him after the converted greedy algorithm is terminated. That
is, following inequalities hold for a sufficiently small :
∀i : advi < , advS < 
Informally, these definitions say our framework successfully
converts a greedy algorithm to a privacy-preserving one if any
polynomial-time adversary cannot increase his probability to
guess the correct private information d(i) or the global solution
Sˆ after the converted algorithm terminates.
With aforementioned definitions, our problem to be solved
in this paper is: designing a framework which securely con-
verts any generic greedy algorithm for a greedy-class problem
P = (I,D, d(·), f(·), l(·)) to a privacy-preserving one which
achieves the same solution set as the original algorithm.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
As aforementioned, we have to prevent privacy leakages in
three parts in distributed greedy algorithms. Essentially, we
need to compute the weight w(i, S), sort the instances based
on that (to find the argmax(w(i, S))) and compute l(·) without
5disclosing private information to adversaries. SMC is a good
theoretic solution to any privacy-preserving computation and
can be used to finish those jobs securely. However, it is subject
to the drawbacks we discussed in Section II which makes it
impractical to use in reality. Therefore, we employ an existing
work [27] as a building block in our framework. We assume
an infinite number domain in this section, but all arithmetic
operations is conducted under a finite integer group and thus
corresponding modulo operations are followed.
A. Building Block
Jung et al. implemented a multi-party polynomial evaluation
protocol [27] in which the following multivariate polynomial
is evaluated without disclosing any xi provided by various
participants.
poly(x) =
m∑
k=1
(ck
n∏
i=1
x
di,k
i )
Notably, they implemented entire protocol in an insecure
channel (i.e., no need to exchange encryption/decryption keys
in advance) while xi’s are kept secret to each other. Two
models are proposed in their protocol: One Aggregater model
and Participants Only model. In the former model, only a
third-party authority receives the evaluation result while all
the participants are recipients of the result in the latter one.
This Multi-party Polynomial Evaluation Protocol (MPEP)
along with two models can be used to implement following
functions in a privacy-preserving manner.
B. Secure Computation of w(i, S)
Computation of w(i, S) is the first step of any greedy algo-
rithm because the sorting is based on this weight (Algorithm
1). However, the current solution set S, which should be kept
secret to agents, is related in many problems. For example,
in a common greedy algorithm of the Set Cover problem, the
weight is defined as:
w(i, S) =
∣∣∣⋃i′∈S∪{i} i′∣∣∣− ∣∣⋃i′∈S i′∣∣
d(i′)
Then, in such problems, we need to let each agent compute
the weight of his instance without knowing S. Note that a
solution set is a set of chosen instances, and we use a n-
dimensional binary vector S to represent it, where its k-th bit
sk = 1 if ak’s instance ik ∈ S and 0 otherwise. The w(ik, S)
is essentially a function: f(s0, · · · , sn), and we can find a
polynomial to directly or indirectly compute it, which can be
conducted securely via MPEP in [27].
For the above WSCP, another m-dimensional vector CS
can be defined to indicate whether m items are included in
currently chosen sets S, where the k-th bit ck,S = 1 if k-th
item is included and 0 otherwise. Then, we have:
ck,S = 1−
n∏
j=1
(1− cj,k,S)
where cj,k,S = 1 if k-th item is in aj’s instance and his
instance is in S, and cj,k,S = 0 otherwise. Then, the final
weight can be computed via:
w(i, S) =
# of 1’s in CS∪{i} − # of 1’s in CS
d(i)
=
∑m
j=1 cj,S∪{i} −
∑m
j=1 cj,S
d(i)
=
∑m
k=1(1−
∏n
j=1(1− cj,k,S∪{i}))−
∑m
k=1(1−
∏n
j=1(1− cj,k,S))
d(i)
The numerator can be evaluated via One Aggregater MPEP
where only the owner of the instance i receives the result, and
the recipient can divide d(i) to the result to achieve his weight
w(i, S).
Different problems have different weight functions and thus
different polynomials to evaluate. Even the same problem may
have several different equivalent polynomials, and thus it is
out of this paper’s scope to give a general conversion for any
type of problems. We assume the participants of the problem
(central authority or agent) have agreed on one polynomial in
advance.
C. Finding the Maximal Weight w(i, S)
The goal is to find the instance with maximal weight with-
out disclosing its weight. Rank-Preserved Encryption ([50])
or Ranking based on Searchable Encryption ([8]) could be
considered, but they all require key exchanges via secure
communication channel in advance, and therefore we use the
following idea. Our idea is to linearly transform the weight
w(i, S) → (w(i, S) + δ)δ′ and sort the instances based on
the transformed weights to find the instance with the maximal
weight. The challenge is to let agents agree on two global
random numbers δ, δ′ without knowing their exact values. We
use the MPEP to achieve this non-trivial goal as follows.
Firstly, three agents A = {ap, aq, ar} are randomly chosen
among all aj ∈ {a1, · · · , an}. Each aj ∈ A individually and
independently picks two random numbers δj , δ′j 6= 0. Then, the
following transformation is conducted for all j ∈ {1, · · · , n}
(Protocol 2), where ij is aj’s instance.
In the final transformed weight, δp + δq + δr is the δ, and
δ′pδ
′
qδ
′
r is the δ
′ that are used in the linear transformation
w(i, S)→ (w(i, S)+δ)δ′. The result recipient can sort the in-
stances according to the transformed weights that he received,
and he learns only the rank of the instances and nothing about
the weight w(i, S) due to the random numbers
∑
δk and
∏
δk.
The reason we pick three random agents is because random
numbers can be inferred when aj ∈ {ap, aq, ar} if we have
less than three random numbers. Furthermore, to guarantee the
correctness of the sorting, we need to have some conditions
for the random numbers due to the modulo operations. This
will be discussed in Section VI.
We assume some user authentication mechanism is in place
so that the central authority (agent-authority model) knows the
owner of each transformed weight since he needs to arrange
each instance into a solution set. In contrary, we assume
the ownership of the instance is hidden by employing an
anonymized protocol (e.g., [35]) or anonymized network (e.g.,
6Protocol 2 Transformation for w(ij , S)
1: The following sum is evaluated via One Aggregater MPEP,
where a randomly chosen agent ax ∈ A (ax 6= aj) is the
only recipient who achieves the result, and aj provides
w(ij , S).
sumj = w(ij , S) + (δp + δq + δr)
2: All agents in {a1, · · · , an} participate in the following
product calculation:
prodj = (w(ij , S) + δp + δq + δr)δ
′
pδ
′
qδ
′
r
where w(ij , S) + δp + δq + δr is provided by the agent
ax, who is chosen at Step 1, and δ′p, δ
′
q, δ
′
r are provided by
ap, aq, ar respectively, and all agents not in A provide 1 as
their input. In the agent-authority model, One Aggregater
MPEP (the central authority is the only recipient) is used
so that only the central authority knows the results, while
Participants Only MPEP is used to broadcast transformed
weights to every agent.
3: The result is the transformed weight of w(ij , S).
https://www.torproject.org/) in the all-agents model. This is
necessary because disclosing the ownership tells all agents
everyone else’s rank, and this may give side information about
the global solution set to adversaries (discussed in Section VI).
D. Feasibility Check
The goal of this function is to check whether a set of
instances S is feasible. We have three different methods to
check the feasibility: set-based check, algebra-based check,
and graph-based check.
Set-based check
To enhance the understanding, we define maximal feasible
set and minimal feasible set first.
Definition 4. A feasible set S is maximal (minimal) if it is not
a superset of any smaller feasible set.
Then, we use the following subset-closure property to check
the feasibility of a given set S for the packing problem.
∀S1, S2 ⊆ S1 : S1 is feasible→ S2 is feasible
Similarly, superset-closure property, which is an analogue of
the subset-closure property, can be used to check the feasibility
of a given set S in the covering problem.
In the packing (covering) problem, any subset (superset) of
a feasible set is also feasible. Then, a given set S is feasible if
and only if it is a subset (superset) of some maximal (minimal)
feasible set, or it is one of the maximal (minimal) feasible sets
itself. Consequently, one only needs to see if S ⊆ S′ (S′ ⊆ S)
for all maximal (minimal) feasible sets S′ to evaluate l(·).
We use the same n-dimensional binary vector S used in
secure weight computation (Section IV-B). Due to the inner
product property, S ⊆ S′ if and only if S · (1−S′) = 0, where
1 is an n-dimensional vector having 1’s for all bits. Then,
given a family of all maximal (minimal) feasible sets S∗, one
can evaluate the l(S) of a packing problem by evaluating the
following term:
∃S′ ∈ S∗ : S · (1− S′) =
n∑
j=1
sj · (1− s′j) = 0
⇔
∏
S′∈S∗
(
n∑
j=1
sj · (1− s′j)) = 0
i.e., l(S) = True if the above sum value is 0 for some maximal
feasible set S′. l(·) of the covering problem can be evaluated
in a similar way.
In the agent-authority model, this evaluation can be con-
ducted locally at the central authority’s side. This is possible
because the central authority has all the instances, instances’
ranks in terms of their weights, the intermediate solution set
S during the greedy algorithm, and all maximal feasible sets
in S∗. He can create the vectors S and S′ at every round of
the feasibility check and evaluate the above product locally.
In the self-learning model, all maximal feasible sets are
given to agents, but the instances in the final global solution
Sˆ should be kept secret. Thus no one is allowed to access
the intermediate solution set S (otherwise great amount of
information about Sˆ is leaked), and no one has the vector S.
That is, each agent aj has a secret binary value sj indicating
whether his instance is included in the S, and essentially
we need to compute the
∑
sj · (1 − s′j) without disclosing
individual sj . This sum value can be evaluated securely via
privacy-preserving sum calculation in [27] (Participants Only
Model) to allow all agents to know whether the sum value is
0 without knowing individual sj .
This idea is intuitive and applicable to any type of greedy-
class problem, but it has some limitations.
1) All maximal feasible sets should be given (in encrypted
format) in advance.
2) Construction of maximal feasible sets requires private in-
formation associated with the instances in some problems
(e.g., Knapsack and Job Scheduling problem).
Therefore, we rely on the following two methods when set-
based check is not possible.
Algebra-based check
In some greedy-class problems, the feasibility constraints
are given by a set of algebraic inequalities which are closely
related to the private information. That is, given a set of
instances S and its associated information set D, the feasibility
constraint is: 
f1(S,D) ≤ θ1
f2(S,D) ≤ θ2
· · ·
fk(S,D) ≤ θk
where each fi(S,D) is some function of S,D which returns
a real value and θi is a threshold value depending on the
problem. l(S) returns true if all the feasibility constraints
are satisfied. For example, in a 0-1 Knapsack problem, there
7is only one constraint: f1(S,D) ≤ θ1, where f1(S,D) is
S’s total weight and θ1 is the total capacity, and in the Job
scheduling problem, if there are k jobs in the scheduling list,
there are k − 1 constraints: the finish time of the job Ji−1
should be less than the start time of the job Ji. Note that an
equality can be trivially converted to two inequalities (e.g.,
a = b⇔ a ≥ b, a ≤ b).
Since the feasibility is related to the private information
associated with the instances, neither central authority nor the
agent can check the feasibility locally. We need to privately
evaluate the inequalities without disclosing agents’ private
information.
It seems the building block [27] can be used to solve this
problem, where the input values of f1, f2, · · · , fk are provided
by the owners of various instances in S. However, the protocol
proposed in [27] only evaluates a polynomial in an integer
domain. Therefore, an integer constraints set represented by
polynomials should be found first:
poly1(S,D) ≤ θ′1
poly2(S,D) ≤ θ′2
· · ·
polyk(S,D) ≤ θ′k
Then, we can run MPEP in [27] to evaluate the polynomial
values to check the inequalities in a distributed manner without
knowing anything about any instances’ private information.
One Aggregater MPEP is used in the agent-authority model
and Participants Only MPEP is used in the self-learning model.
However, this reveals the polynomial values to adversaries,
which could be used to infer private information. For example,
the constraint inequality in Knapsack problem is chosen items’
total weight, and this value can be used to infer individual
item’s weight. Therefore, we evaluate the following inequali-
ties instead:
(poly1(S,D)− θ′1)
∏n−1
j=0 δj,1 ≤ 0
(poly2(S,D)− θ′2)
∏n−1
j=0 δj,3 ≤ 0
· · ·
(polyk(S,D)− θ′k)
∏n−1
j=0 δj,k ≤ 0
where δj,k is a random number independently chosen by aj for
the k-th inequality and
∏
δj,k acts as a global random number
as in the weight transformation. By doing so, the polynomial
values are masked by the global random number.
Graph-based check
Different from the above case, the feasibility constraints in
some greedy-class problems are given by a graph structure.
Given a set of instances S and its information set D, the set
is represented by a graph structure GS = (VS , ES) depending
on the problem, and l(S) returns true if some graph constraints
are satisfied. Therefore, one needs to convert the set S to a
graph GS first (two examples, WDCA and Set Cover problems
are shown below) such that the feasibility is equivalent to
some graph constraint in GS . Different problems have different
conversion, and it is out of this paper’s scope to formally
model the conversion. We simply assume the conversion is
given in advance.
The graph constraints fall into one of the following cate-
gories:
1) Node covering: the constraint is satisfied if all nodes are
covered at least once.
2) Node packing: the constraint is satisfied if each node is
covered at most once.
3) Edge covering: the constraint is satisfied if all edges are
covered at least once.
4) Edge packing: the constraint is satisfied if each edge is
covered at most once.
Note that a problem with graph-based constraints may not
be a graph-based problem. For example, the WDCA is an
auction problem to find the bundle allocation, and it is not
a graph-related problem. However, its constraint is an edge
packing type: each node represents each bidder and there is
an edge between two bidders if one’s bundle is not compatible
with another one’s bundle, and an edge is covered if either
incident node’s (bidder’s) bundle is included in the S. Then,
one edge being covered by twice means two incompatible
bundles are in S. Its constraint can also be a node packing
type: each node represents each good and it is covered if the
corresponding good is allocated to a bidder by S. Then, one
node being covered twice indicates the good is allocated to
two bidders simultaneously.
For another example, the Set Cover problem’s constraint
belongs to the node covering type: each element can be
represented as a node, and a set is represented as a simple
polygon containing corresponding nodes. Chosen sets are
feasible if the corresponding polygons contain all the nodes
in the graph.
For an instance i, whether each node in GS = (VS , ES) is
covered by i can be represented as a |VS |-dimensional binary
vector i whose k-th bit ik = 1 if the k-th node is covered and
0 otherwise. This is called the coverage status vector of i. For
the problems of edge types, the coverage status vector is a
|ES |-dimensional binary vector. Then, the feasibility function
l(S) returns true if and only if:{
∀k :∑i∈S ik ≥ 1 for node or edge covering type
∀k :∑i∈S ik ≤ 1 for node or edge packing type
according to the definitions of the covering type and packing
type above. For example, in the edge packing type of the
feasibility check for the WDCA problem, VS is the set of all
bidders and ES is the set of edges indicating incompatibility
between bidders. The coverage status vector of a bundle is
a |ES |-dimensional binary vector, where the k-th bit is 1 if
the k-th edge is covered (edges are indexed by arbitrary pre-
defined order). Then, if any bit’s sum over all instances in S
is greater than 1, S is not feasible.
In the agent-authority model, the above inequalities can be
examined locally at the central authority’s side since the cen-
tral authority has all instances and the current solution set S,
therefore he can construct the GS and corresponding coverage
status vectors for all instances to examine the inequalities.
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we can still use the privacy-preserving sum calculation in [27]
to examine the inequalities without disclosing any information
about S. Each agent controls the bits ik’s that are relevant
to his instance (e.g., the k-th incompatibility edge in WDCA
problem).
TABLE II
FEASIBILITY CHECKS COMPARISON
Set-based Universally applicable
Needs all maximal feasible sets in advance
Algebra-based Only applicable to algebra-based checks
Needs integer polynomial constraints
Graph-based Only applicable to graph-based checks
Needs to construct GS
Given a problem, the participants (agent & central authority)
in the framework must agree on the feasibility type first.
Different problem can use different type according to its
demand.
V. FRAMEWORK DESIGN
Now, we are ready to design a framework for any greedy-
class problem in both agent-authority model and all-agents
model based on the aforementioned privacy-preserving sorting
and privacy-preserving feasibility check.
A. Agent-Authority Model
In this model, the central authority needs to learn a solution
set Sˆ without knowing the instances’ private information.
Firstly, the weight of each agent’s instance is computed
securely. Only the owner of the instance receives the result
by using One Aggregater MPEP. Then, agents and the central
authority run the privacy-preserving sorting in Section IV-C.
The MPEP ([27]) in the sorting is executed with the One
Aggregater Model such that only the central authority learns
the polynomial results. When the privacy-preserving sorting is
finished, the central authority gets a set of transformed weights
of agents’ instances as well as a list of the instances in the
order of their weights. Then, the central authority picks the
first instance i in the sorted list and evaluates l(S ∪ {i}).
If the problem’s feasibility is an algebra-based on, he and
the agents are repeatedly engaged in the privacy-preserving
feasibility check in Section IV-D, and the MPEP in the check
is executed with the One Aggregater Model again so that only
the central authority achieves the evaluation result. On the
other hand, if the problem’s feasibility is a graph-based one
or a set-based one, the central authority checks the feasibility
at his side locally. If the feasibility check returns true, S and
{i} are merged to form a new S, and the whole process is
repeated until the termination condition is satisfied.
When the algorithm terminates, the central authority
achieves the global solution set Sˆ = S from the greedy
algorithm without knowing any agent’s private information,
and all agents do not gain any information about Sˆ either.
B. Self-learning Model
In this model, each agent aj needs to learn his local solution
set Sˆj ⊆ Sˆ without knowing Sˆ or others’ private information.
Firstly, each agent achieves his own weight via privacy-
preserving weight computation (Section IV-B). Then, they
run the privacy-preserving sorting as well, but the MPEP is
executed with the Participants Only Model, where all the
participants learn the polynomial results. When the privacy-
preserving sorting is finished, the agents gets a set of trans-
formed weights of all instances, and each agent knows the rank
of his instance among all instances in terms of the weight.
Secondly, the feasibility of S∪{i} should be checked in the
order of the instances’ weight, therefore the participants jointly
and repeatedly run the feasibility check in Section IV-D. If i is
the k-th instance in the sorted list, l(S∪{i}) is checked at the
k-th round of the feasibility check, and S includes all instances
who have returned ‘True’ so far. Then, any one of the three
feasibility checks in IV-D can be used to check S ∪ {i}’s
feasibility depending on the problem. At each round, if the
S∪{i} is feasible, i is merged in S to form a new intermediate
solution set S := S ∪ {i}.
These two steps are repeated until the termination condition
is satisfied.
When the algorithm terminates, every agent knows whether
his instance is included in the final solution set Sˆ but nothing
else. In fact, no one in the system has any information about
Sˆ in this model.
C. Running Example of the WSCP
We show an example of our framework in this section. We
will use our framework to let n agents solve the Set Cover
problem using the following greedy algorithm in the all-agents
model. At the end, agents should know whether their instances
are in the final solution set Sˆ or not.
Algorithm 3 Greedy algorithm for the WSCP
1: S := ∅. The weight is defined as
w(i, S) =
∣∣∣⋃i′∈S∪{i} i′∣∣∣− ∣∣⋃i′∈S i′∣∣
d(i′)
2: Given S, compute w(i, S) for each instance i ∈ I .
3: Sort the instances in the non-increasing order of the weight
w(i, S) and find the i = argmaxiw(i, S).
4: If ¬l(S ∪ {i}) = True, S := S ∪ {i}.
5: Repeat 2-4 until ¬l(S ∪ {i}) = False.
6: Return S ∪ {i} as Sˆ.
At the first iteration, since S = ∅, each agent aj locally
computes his weight w(ij , S) =
|ij |
d(ij)
. Then, the agents
participate in the instance sorting (Section IV-C) to receive the
transformed weights of all instances. Then, everyone locally
sorts the instances based on the transformed weight, and the
owner of the i = argmaxi(w(i, S) + δ)δ
′ knows that his
instance is in Sˆ. In the next iteration, weight computation
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MPEP to update each instance’s weight, where only the owner
of each instance receives the corresponding weight. At this
computation, the owner of the instances in the solution set
(i.e., i ∈ S) will set the corresponding cj,k,S = 1 in the weight
computation. Then, the instance sorting is run again to let all
agents receive transformed weights. Note that new random
numbers δ, δ′ are used in each transformation. Agents locally
sort the instances to find the instance i with the maximum
weight, and they run the feasibility check (Section IV-D) to
see if ¬l(S ∪ {i}) = True. If yes, the owner knows that his
instance is in Sˆ. This is repeated until ¬l(S ∪ {i}) = False,
the owner of the last instance i also knows that his instance is
included in the Sˆ. Everyone else learns that his instance is not
in the final solution set Sˆ. No weight is disclosed to anyone
during the greedy algorithm, and no one knows whose instance
is in the final solution set Sˆ because all computation, sorting
and the check are conducted in a privacy-preserving manner
as we presented in Section IV.
VI. SECURITY EVALUATION
In this section, we first prove that no one is able to design
a privacy-preserving sorting and feasibility check without the
assumption that the discrete logarithm problem is hard. Then,
we show that our framework achieves privacy if agent or
central authority cannot solve the discrete logarithm problem
by proving that no adversary gains extra advantage via our
framework.
A. Random Numbers in Sorting
We assumed an infinite number domain in our framework,
but in fact, all computation is conducted in a finite cyclic inte-
ger group in a real implementation. Suppose the integer group
we choose is a subset of an integer group Zp (i.e., {1, · · · , p−
1}) and corresponding modulo operations are followed after
all arithmetic operations, then it becomes important to find
‘good’ random numbers so that (w(ij , S)+
∑
δ)
∏
δ′ < p for
all j ∈ {1, · · · , n} in the weight transformation (correctness
of comparisons), otherwise, the rank of each instance is not
preserved after modulo operations. On the other hand, we also
need to guarantee that the random numbers are large enough
to securely mask w(ij , S).
Suppose the bit lengths of w(ij , S) and each δk ∈
{δp, δq, δr} are all b1 and the bit lengths of all δ′k ∈ {δ′p, δ′q, δ′r}
are b2. Then,
∑
δk ≤ 3 · (2b1 − 1), and
∏
δ′k ≤ (2b2 − 1)3,
and the bit-length of (w(ij , S) +
∑
δk)
∏
δ′k is:
dlog2 4 + 1 + b1e+ 3 · b2 = 3 + b1 + 3b2
which should be less than or equal to bp − 1 (bp is p’s bit
length) to guarantee the correctness of the sorting. We can let
b1 = b2 = d bp5 e, then the condition is satisfied, and the (δp +
δq+δr)δ
′
pδ
′
qδ
′
r is huge enough (whose bit-length is 4d bp5 e+3)
to mask the original weight w(ij , S) regardless of its size
(even if w(ij , S) is binary).
B. Adversaries’ Advantage on Private Information
Private information might be leaked in the following three
parts: weight computation, instance sorting based on trans-
formed weights, and the feasibility check involving private
information and w(i, S).
Theorem 1. Assuming that discrete logarithm is hard, the
adversary’s advantage advi is less than any positive  for
every i.
Proof: It is proved in [27] that given a communication
string, any value within the input domain has the same
probability to be the value encrypted in the communication
string. Informally, the multiplicative cyclic group that they
used has a prime order, and because the order of the group
is prime, for a given ciphertext C, one can find a random
number ri for any input xi which generates the same ciphertext
C = E(xi, ri).
Therefore, given any communication string C in the weight
computation or transformation (Section IV), any adversary
cannot do better than a random guess, which implies
Pr[w(i, S)|C,Output] = Pr[w(i, S)|Output]
because an adversary can only do a random guess if he is only
given the output. This also implies
Pr[d(i)|C,Output] = Pr[d(i)|Output]⇒ ∀i : advi = 0
since private information can only be inferred from the weight
in the weight computation and transformation.
In the algebra-based feasibility check, which is the only type
among three that involves private information, the feasibility
check is to examine the set of integer inequalities represented
with polynomials:
(poly1(S,D)− θ′1)
∏n−1
j=0 δj,1 ≤ 0
(poly2(S,D)− θ′2)
∏n−1
j=0 δj,3 ≤ 0
· · ·
(polyk(S,D)− θ′k)
∏n−1
j=0 δj,k ≤ 0
which essentially is conducted via polynomial evaluation.
Therefore, it does not leak any information about instances’
private information either. Therefore, an adversary cannot do
better than a random guess either. In conclusion, ∀i : advi = 0.
C. Adversaries’ Advantage on Solution Set
In the agent-authority model, only the central authority
learns the final solution set Sˆ and each agent learns nothing.
Therefore, an agent’s advantage on inferring Sˆ is defined
as an adversary’s advantage advS . In the all-agents model,
every agent only learns whether his instance is included in Sˆ
(i.e., local solution set Sˆi). Therefore, an agent’s advantage
on inferring Sˆ is defined as an adversary’s advantage advS
(Section III). Information about Sˆ may be leaked in two parts:
weight computation and feasibility check. In this section, we
prove that the adversaries’ advantages advS is negligible in
the weight computation and the feasibility check by showing
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that they gain no useful information about any bit in Sˆ (except
his own bit).
Weight computation: The weight to be computed is poly-
nomial, and this is evaluated via MPEP in [27]. Since no
communication string leaks useful information about the input
value in MPEP, adversaries gain no useful information about
other’s bit in S after the weight computation.
Set-based check: This type of check is essentially to eval-
uate the following product.∏
S′∈S∗
(
n∑
j=1
sj · (1− s′j)) = 0
This is conducted locally at the central authority’s side in the
agent-authority model, therefore agents gain literally nothing.
In the all-agents model, all agents jointly compute the above
sum via MPEP, and communication strings do not leak any
information about the input value according to the proof in
[27]. Therefore, any agent cannot learn anything about other’s
bit in S.
Algebra-based check: A set of integer inequalities repre-
sented by polynomials are examined in this check. In both
of the agent-authority model and the all-agents model, the
inequalities are examined via MPEP, and therefore the agent
aj having k-th instance ij in the sorted list learns nothing but
whether the intermediate solution set S is feasible after his
instance ij is included after the k-th round of the feasibility
check. Therefore, all that agents learn at each round of the
feasibility check is whether the current solution set is feasible
after someone else’s instance is included without knowing
which instance of whom is included. Therefore, any adversary
cannot learn anything about other’s bit in S.
Graph-based check: In this type of feasibility check, the
following inequalities are examined.{
∀k :∑i∈S ik ≥ 1 for node or edge covering type
∀k :∑i∈S ik ≤ 1 for node or edge packing type
In the agent-authority model, the inequalities are examined
locally at the central authority’s side. Therefore, agents gain
nothing at all.
In the all-agents model, the sum value is evaluated via
privacy-preserving sum calculation in [27]. It is already proved
that all communication strings do not leak information about
input value (i.e., ik in our case), therefore, agents achieves no
useful information about single si’s in S.
Therefore, the adversaries gain no useful information about
S.
In conclusion, in the weight computation as well as all the
feasibility checks, adversaries gain no useful information on
Sˆ from the communication strings. Therefore, the posterior
probability is same as the priori probability. That is,
advS =
∣∣∣Pr[Sˆ|C,Output]− Pr[Sˆ|Output]∣∣∣ = 0
D. Side Information of Instance’s Rank
We claimed in Section IV that the ownership of the trans-
formed weight should be hidden in the all-agents model.
If the ownership of each transformed weight is not hidden,
every agent knows other agents’ ranks, and these ranks, in
accordance with the feasibility check, may give significant side
information about the global solution set.
For example, in some problems’ greedy algorithms, all
instances ahead of the very first instance who satisfies the
termination condition (in the sorted list) are included in
the solution set Sˆ (e.g., Knapsack, WSCP) while others do
not (Job Scheduling, WDCA). In such cases, although the
feasibility check in our framework does not leak information
about the solution set, agents can infer the solution set based
on the rank of the transformed weights.
One may try to get rid of the sorting and implement only the
‘argmax’ function to further hide each agent’s rank and thus
getting rid of the anonymized network, but currently we are
not able to design an ‘argmax’ function in a privacy-preserving
manner efficiently without sorting.
E. Possible Inference and Solutions
Although our framework does not increase agents’ advan-
tage on the solution set Sˆ, agents may infer useful information
via underlying greedy algorithm.
In some problems, the conversion from S to GS (Section
IV-D) might leak information about Sˆ. For example, we have
mentioned that WDCA problem can have an edge-packing
check and a node-packing check. However, the edge-packing
check allows each agent to know whether his neighbors
in GS have their instances in Sˆ. Every bidder aj has an
incompatibility edge with another bidder ak if their bundles
ij , ik are incompatible (i.e., have same item), therefore, aj’s
failing the feasibility check tells him one or more neighbors
in GS have their instances in the final solution set. However,
this inference can be trivially prevented by using node-packing
check which is aforementioned.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Communication Overhead
Reducing the number of messages exchange is one of our
main contributions. Some privacy-preserving computation in
our framework is conducted via different polynomials for
different problems, and we denote the number of additions
and multiplications in the corresponding polynomial as #poly
if exact number varies for different problems. However, note
that #poly is usually a polynomial of n (number of agents).
For example, the #poly of the weight computation for the Set
Cover problem is 2mn as shown in Section IV-B, where m is
the number of total items in the universe set. The following
table shows the number of message exchanges, including both
received ones and sent ones.
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TABLE III
NUMBER OF MESSAGE EXCHANGES
Agent-Authority Model
Agent Learner
weight computation O(n(#poly)) O(#poly)
instance sorting O(n2) O(n)
feasibility check O(n(#poly)) O(#poly)
All-Agents Model
weight computation O(n(#poly))
instance sorting O(n2)
feasibility check O(n(#poly))
B. Computation Overhead
To evaluate the computation overhead, we implemented the
weight computation, instance sorting and feasibility check in
Section IV. To exclude the communication overhead from
the measurement, we generated all the communication strings
(ciphertexts) and conducted all the computation at a local
computer. The protocols are implemented in Ubuntu 12.04
using the GMP library [1] based on C in a computer with Intel
i3-2365M CPU @ 1.40 GHz ×4, Memory 4GB and SATA
Hard Drive 500GB (5400RPM).
Since various problems have different #poly for the weight
computation and the feasibility check, we present the compu-
tation overhead of a single addition and a single multiplication
for them. We measured the average run time of 10,000
additions and 10,000 multiplications of two random numbers
in Zp respectively, which is shown in Figure 1(c) and 1(d). The
integer group size is the size of the finite number domain, i.e.,
the bit length of p.
The Figure 1(e) and 1(f) show the computation overhead
of the instance sorting based on their weights. We randomly
generated a 20-bit weight for each agent and conducted the
weight transformation as well as the final sorting based on the
transformed weights. Quicksort is used in the sorting, and we
observed that the sorting’s computation overhead is negligible
when compared with the one of the transformation. Each time
is the run time of the central authority in the agent-authority
model. Agents in the agent-authority model has much less
run time since they only generate the communication strings
(ciphertexts). In the all-agents model, all of the agents have
the same computation overhead as the central authority, since
everyone needs to compute the final weights based on the
received ciphertexts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We successfully designed a universal framework for dis-
tributed greedy algorithms in which the final solution comes
from each agent’s input instance. We use our novel secure
weight computation, privacy-preserving sorting, and privacy-
preserving feasibility check techniques to prevent underlying
potential risk of private information leakage in the distributed
greedy algorithms. We also show in our evaluation that the
extra computation overhead introduced by our framework is
small, and that the communication overhead in is much less
than other general solutions to the DCOP, and we prove that
our framework does not increase adversaries’ advantage in
breaking the privacy.
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